the Declaration of Independence of 1776: the Pursuit of Happiness; and it is the American political system that makes it possible for both individuals and diverse social groups as well as the nation as a whole to imagine and successfully pursue their respective American Dreams. 4 There are many definitions of that system. President Lincoln described it at the start of the Civil War: "This is the just and generous and prosperous system which opens the way to all, gives hope to all, and consequent energy and progress and improvement of condition to all." 5 The success of that system is what defines the United States throughout its history, even though James Truslow Adams did not popularize the phrase "the American Dream" until 1931. 6 The American republic was founded on the promise of 1776, and its national identity was gradually forged around the belief in the possibility of a national success story that would make that promise a reality.
Identity
When Crèvecoeur posed his ageless question in the 1770s "What, then, is the American, this new man?", he told the story of a poor immigrant called Andrew, newly arrived in the USA, who was given the all-important advice that his future success would depend entirely on his own conduct. 7 American national identity was thus linked to the idea of the successful pursuit of happiness from the very beginning. 8 Indeed, Rumanian scholar Diana Stiuliuc argues that the American Dream is the cultural expression of American identity. 9 Clearly, however, in historical perspective the American Dream has meant different things to different individuals and social groups. What I am proposing here is that, 4 Jennifer L. Hochschild, Facing Up to the American Dream: Race, Class and the Soul of the Nation, Princeton 1995, p. 37, says: "the political culture of the United States is largely shaped by a set of views in which the American Dream is prominent, and by a set of institutions that make it even more prominent". 5 whatever the personal or collective hopes and aspirations of Americans may be, and whatever the direction of their efforts in pursuit of those dreams, everybody's "dream" is based on a single, simple belief, and that is, that every worthwhile goal is attainable, in short, that success is possible in the United States. It matters not what you want to do, or who you want to be. The one thing that all Americans have cherished, as the cultural matrix of their society, is the conviction that success is possible. Peter Freese posits this idea as one of six key elements making up the American Dream, but one could argue that it is this one "belief in the general attainability of success" that makes all the other goals viable. 10 The Obama election campaign slogan of 2009 "Yes, we can" tapped into that American belief. The message was loud and clear: We can win the election, and a black man can be the President of the United States. The possibility of success in chosen pursuits, then, lies at the heart of all the "can do, can be" identities of Americans.
Perceptions
Both success and identity are, however, the result of personal and social constructions, and as such, are part of the complex world of perceptions. They are slippery enough to negotiate even within any given culture, but the processes of recognizing, measuring and evaluating other people's success are complicated many times over by cultural factors connected with the construction of one's own identity and of alterity. 11 In the case of the United States, the highly propagandistic nature of public discourse during the revolutionary era created a natural reference point for participants both at home and observers abroad. Formal expressions of intentions and values became blueprints for the formation of national identity as well as measuring sticks of success, setting the stage for people's expectations everywhere. The Declaration of Independence and other founding documents set out American motives, intentions, and visions for the future, holding out the promise of a better society with a better political system. They became the references for the identity of the United States as a nation-state and the measuring sticks of its success.
The perception of American national identity has often been intimately associated with the idea of US exceptionalism. 12 This is a fascinating subject of 10 cultural history, not only because it has been (and for many remains) a central belief of American nationalism, but because of its historical and current repercussions in transnational and international relations. The idea of US exceptionalism (at least until the mid-20th century) was often embraced by liberal or progressive groups in Europe and other parts of the world and instrumentalized in their own public discourse as the historical American model-myth. 13 A vast literature defines and dissects these ideas but one essential ingredient upon which all would agree is that American exceptionalism has revolved around the notion of US collective success as a nation. Without that success, American exceptionalism would have attracted little attention. It would have taken its place among all the other exceptionalist national narratives. 14 My aim now is to discuss US success as American national identity through Spanish impressions over the long term. Jennifer Hochschild proposes that success can be categorized as absolute, relative, and/or competitive. 15 Clearly, the relative and competitive components of the perceptions of another nation's success are especially relevant to an understanding of the views of foreign observers, whose perspectives depend on the social and cultural characteristics of their own country. 16 The study will focus on Spanish perceptions of the element that has been central to the formation of American national identity and self-image of success the US political system, that is, American democracy at the three turns of the century since the Revolutionary Era, all of which have been critical moments in the history of Spanish-US relations. 17 Exceptionalism, New Haven 2009. For a thoughtful recent study of its current vitality and its capacity to provoke controversy, see Ian Tyrrell, "The Myth(s) that Will Not Die: American National Exceptionalism," in Gérard Bouchard, ed., National Myths: Constructed Pasts, Contested Presents, New York 2013, pp. 46-65. 13 The subject lends itself in many interesting ways to the new transnational history. 
Foreign Eyes: Continuity and Change in Spanish Perceptions of the United States
The most enduring Spanish attitude toward the United States since 1776 has tended to be unfavorable. Anti-American prejudices and negative stereotypical images have been constantly recycled, most of the time by successive generations of political and cultural conservatives, but in the twentieth century (especially since the 1960s) mainly by Spanish socialists, communists and other left-leaning progressives. 18 For nation-states to construct an exceptional or uniquely superior self-image is not historically unusual. Both Spain and the United States did so. They also share the experience, when at the height of their power, of having been singled out for denigration as exceptionally evil empires by their international enemies. Much more unusual is the adoption and diffusion by foreigners of another nation's own finest self-perception. Nonetheless, foreign exaltation of American exceptionalism has existed in many countries, including Spain, but has been far less studied. * * * In the late eighteenth century and early 1800s, Spain was a vast empire, under a monarchy that was both despotic and enlightened with cautiously reformist tendencies. Attitudes towards the emerging North American republic were mainly negative, because it posed an obvious threat, in many ways, to the Hispanic imperial monarchy. 19 Nonetheless, the evolving interests and ideologies of Spain's governing elites generated some ambivalent, even positive views of the United States, revealing that a small minority of the Spanish enlightened leaders saw in the young republic a new political model inspired by an ideology that held many attractions. A few observers clearly valued certain images of the United States as comparative references, or propaganda, for political purposes within Spain.
Spaniards in the know were already impressed by Angloamerican successes in demographic growth and mobility, territorial settlement and expansion, economic development and material wealth, and soon US political achievements confirmed their view that this was a great power in the making. In the 1780s, Antonio de Alcedo published a solidly informative 5-volume geographical-historical encyclopaedia of the Americas. On the United States, he included a quotation from an American source of 1774: "The time has arrived for an important revolution, whose success or failure will perpetuate forever the sorrow or the admiration of posterity [...] the future happiness or misery of its innumerable descendants". 20 During the American war of Independence, Count Aranda was the Spanish ambassador in Paris. He met the American envoys there and signed the treaty of 1783 on behalf of Spain. In that year Aranda penned a famous report to the King in which he predicted that this new nation, "born a pygmy", would soon become a giant and eventually an "irresistible colossus" because the advantages offered by the combination of its geographical conditions and its unique political system would naturally and inevitably guarantee American success as a nation-state. 21 In the first critical twenty years of US independence, keen Spanish observers noted the many internal forces that threatened to destroy the Union, so the first all-important success that Spanish sources underscored, after the creation of the Union, was the success in maintaining and consolidating it. They realized immediately that the federal constitution of 1787 was a decisive step in the strengthening of the central government, and they also foresaw that it would be an efficient political instrument to encourage and control territorial expansion without compromising individual freedom or national unity. After that, predictions of future American successes were frequent, and generally associated with dire warnings about the threat to Spanish monarchical, imperial and Catholic interests. 23 Manuel Gayoso, as the governor of Spanish Luisiana (that is the entire territory west of the Mississippi to the Rocky Mountains), faced the front line of American expansion and he dealt with westering pioneers on a daily basis. He had no doubts that the political system adopted by the United States in 1787 was ideally suited to support popular expansion across the continent and ensure the successful territorial growth of the nation. 24 After fighting in the Spanish forces that distracted British troops in Florida during the US war for independence, a young Francisco de Miranda traveled in the United States in 1783-1784. He was to become the best known early precursor of Spanish American independence movements. Fully impressed by US successes in the collective pursuit of happiness by the beginning of the nineteenth century, the example of their political system inspired Miranda's hopes for the future of Spanish America: Let us follow in the footsteps of our brothers the North Americans, establishing like them a free and wise government; we shall obtain the same benefits that they have and enjoy now. They 25 For his part, Valentín de Foronda corresponded with Jefferson when he was serving as a Spanish consul in Philadelphia. His liberal ideas caused him to fall out of favor when he returned to Spain, but he, too, was a great admirer of the success attained by Americans in only a few years. 26 In sum, it was real and foreseeable American success that inspired both the majority discourse of hostile criticism and the more positive responses of a minority. As the United States went from strength to strength, and its identity as a democratic nation matured, at the root of early Spanish anti-Americanism were two fundamental issues: the knowledge that US independence and expansion would threaten the future of Spain's vast overseas empire (what the United States might do) and, closer to home, fear that US republican democracy would threaten Spain's monarchical regime and traditionalist Catholic culture (what the United States was or represented). By contrast, at the heart of the more favorable views lay a few enlightened Spaniards' admiration of American success in the democratic experiment and their hopes for the future fulfilment of the promise of 1776 in their own country. * * * After fighting a desperate people's war of independence against invading Napoleonic armies, Spain limped on through the nineteenth century as a monarchy which very slowly and painfully evolved from royal absolutism to constitutional parliamentarianism, with a brief republican interlude between February 1873 and December 1874. Anti-Americanism was the prevailing attitude towards the United States in this period, but it was especially strong among the dominant monarchical, traditionalist, conservative, Catholic and pan-Hispanist sectors. 27 They harped on the evident contradictions between the proclaimed American ideals and historical or everyday realities (in particular, the treatment of Indians and Africans, the lack of a 'true' ethnic identity, cultural vulgarity, materialism, hypocrisy and political corruption), repeating the negative stereotypes seen throughout Europe. 28 The rhetoric of a traditionalist newspaper during the American War of Secession exemplifies this view: 29 However, all such perceived failings would hardly have raised an eyebrow in Spain, except for the inescapable fact of American success. The Spanish case supports the thesis that the anti-Americanism of European elites has often been fueled by "a particular dismay that success has been achieved by such a seemingly inferior nation, allegedly populated by an unsophisticated people." 30 Spain's dominant conservative elites continued to see their values contradicted and their interests threatened by this functioning republican democracy that not only secured rights for all citizens, including religious freedom, but also championed anticolonialism, self-determination of peoples, and abolitionism, and simultaneously achieved a rate of demographic and economic growth that left Spain far behind. American success scalded Spanish sensibilities and motivated their hostility. 31 Thus, at the root of Spanish anti-Americanism festered their resentment of the ideological and political success of the United States in comparison with Spain's evident decline.
A rather different issue is what this response to American success tells us about the self-image of nineteenth-century Spaniards. One study recently argued that Spaniards developed a "pessimistic self-perception" that contrasted with "the success of the social experiment" in the USA, suggesting that this was why hostile reactionary attitudes and rejection dominated Spanish public discourse concerning the United States. 32 Hating others for having what you want for yourself is a deep psycho-sociological interpretation that might explain Spanish conservatives' envy of American wealth and power, but it does not follow that it sprang from or caused a negative self-image. 33 On the contrary, it seems clear that most of them genuinely believed in the superiority of Hispanic political, social and cultural values.
On the other hand, Spain's progressive liberal, republican and democratic minority did have a negative self-image. They hated Spain's decadence, superstition and backwardness, and I have argued elsewhere that there was clearly a connection between that negative self-perception and admiration of the United States. Their discourse constantly underscored the political, social, economic and cultural success of the US, always attributing it to the democratic republican form of government, and always stressing the comparison with the negative record of failure of the Spanish monarchy. 34 For this small minority in the Spanish political spectrum, American success vindicated their own ideology and gave them the most powerful reason to desire Spanish imitation of the US model. 35 One democratic republican, José María Orense, even proposed to the constitutional convention of 1869 that the US constitution be adopted in Spain, explaining: "in the practical things of life I am always guided by the countries in which our ideal is a reality; I proclaim the complete system practiced in the United States since it gives such good results there." 36 32 Rodríguez Jiménez and Fernández de Miguel, "La larga durabilidad de los estereotipos", pp. 39-41. To support this view they cite Richard L. Kagan, "Prescott's Paradigm: American Historical Scholarship and the Decline of Spain." American Historical Review, 101/2 (1996) pp. 423-446, which studies William Hickling Prescott's creation of an antithetical opposition between Spain as representation of monarchism, indolence, fanaticism and the past, and the USA as representation of republicanism, industriousness, rationality, and the future. However this was Prescott's view, which might be extended to American public opinion, and even to Spanish republicans, but it is not so easy to argue that this was the view of Spanish conservatives, at least not before 1899. 33 Clearly, a major consideration that he thought should be persuasive was that the results obtained by the American democratic republican system proved that it was a great success. For his part, federalist republican leader, Francisco Pí y Margall, summarized this whole theme of Spanish perceptions of the United States as the incarnation of democracy, at the conclusion of the list of virtues and successes which he identified with the United States: "You are liberty," he solemnly declared, "you are democracy." 37 Nonetheless, the dominant nineteenth-century anti-American discourse reached its high point in Spain during the colonial crisis that led to president McKinley's intervention and the Spanish-American war of 1898. 38 At that point, even democratic republicans were criticizing the United States, contradicting their own traditional discourse of admiration for the "Great Republic". Alejandro Lerroux's newspaper, El Progreso, was bitterly critical of Americans: "A people formed by all the detritus, a shapeless pile of social debris; a people whose material abundance goes hand in hand with moral degeneration... The American people... strong with the weak and weak with the strong..." 39 And 40 Most of the republicans who joined in the anti-Americanist cacophony at that time did so ostensibly for patriotic reasons, but I have argued elsewhere that the provocative rhetoric was also part of a strategy to destabilize the monarchy, in the hope of creating an opportunity to launch a new Spanish republic. 41 Astonishingly, however, one small group the Spanish federalist republicans struggled mightily to defend their traditional admiration of the United States, despite the war.
On February 15, 1898, the American ship Maine, supposedly on a friendly visit to the port of Havana in Cuba, exploded and sank in the harbor. Late nineteenth-century "yellow" journalism rushed to exploit the tragedy, and Spanish federalist republicans, fearing that war-mongers on both sides of the Atlantic might push the two governments into a war, repeated their litany identifying the United States with democratic values, urging: "Peace and harmony with the United States! War never! It is the leading nation in the world, the shield of liberty, the torch of progress." 42 Despite their efforts, the war did come, and Spain was quickly defeated. Anti-American discourse at that time might be excused and was certainly understandable but, in reply to Spanish critics, the federalist republicans used the American victory as clear proof of the superior success of that federal republican regime: 44 The Spanish federalists were, nonetheless, true believers in US superiority compared not only with Spain but with all other nations. So, on the last day of 1898 a year that many Spaniards still remember as the year of the 'Disaster', when, after a humiliating defeat, Spain lost all its remaining overseas possessions (Cuba and Puerto Rico in the Caribbean, and the Philippines, the Caroline and Palaos Islands in the Pacific Ocean), this small group of Spanish republicans began to reconstruct their mythical image of the United States.
We 45 As the 1800s gave way to the "American century", Spanish conservatives, like their correligionaries everywhere in Europe, felt increasingly uneasy about the growing success of the American democratic experiment that had brought the United States to great power status. It seemed set to sweep away the established order and to transform the world. 46 Spanish conservatives worried that the United States would use its newly flexed muscles to become a hegemonic power, while democratic liberals and republicans worried that the taste of international military victory would lead their beloved model of democracy towards corruption in militaristic imperialism. * * * Thanks to US intervention in the Second World War, the Marshall Plan and the Fulbright Program, the United States became the leader of the so-called 'free world' during the long Cold War. This American role as the champion of democracy and capitalism was generally well received in most of Western Europe, but Spain's case was different. During General Franco's dictatorial rule (1940-75), both the right and the left of the Spanish political spectrum were anti-American. The nationalistic Catholics and ultra-conservatives of Franco's regime were distrustful of the US democratic form of government and hostile to American culture. 47 The republicans and democrats, on the other hand, felt betrayed because the US did not support the legitimate government of the II Republic (1931) (1932) (1933) (1934) (1935) (1936) (1937) (1938) (1939) At the turn of the twentieth to the twenty-first century, John Ramage affirms that "the influence of the American success ethos is ubiquitous", pervasively persuading that opportunities abound for individuals to attain their own American dream. 54 Ian Tyrrell remarks that "the idea of American Exceptionalism has never been talked about so much as in the first decade of the twenty-first century," and concludes that "this self-sustaining and yet changing set of myths concerning the history of the United States remains vital to the nation's identity." 55 When a 1999 poll taken in the USA took for granted that the country was a success and asked Americans to account for this, a majority gave the credit to the "American system." 56 For his part, President Barack Obama not only wrote a book about reclaiming the American dream, but in two recent speeches appealed to the collective belief in the past and continuing success of the American political system, reflecting the perceived power of this success narrative to inspire the American people, despite criticisms both at home and abroad. 57 Tapping into Americans' sense of their own historical success as a democratic nation, in his 2008 electoral victory speech, he averred: "the true strength of our nation comes not from the might of our arms or the scale of our wealth, but from the enduring power of our ideals: democracy, liberty, opportunity and unyielding hope." 58 In 2009, Obama used the idea in an effort to reconnect the people with essential democratic virtues: "In recent years, we've become enamored with our own past success, lulled into complacency by the glitter of our own achievements. [...] forgetting the qualities that got us there". 59 The following year, he waxed eloquent on the same theme of American democracy, stressing his own belief in its continuing record as the world's most successful political system: Before we get too depressed about the current state of our politics, let's remember our history. [...] What is amazing is that despite all the conflict, despite all its flaws and its frustrations, our experiment in democracy has worked better than any form of government on Earth. 60 All such comments suggest that, far from weakening, the connections between American exceptionalism, national identity and success are maintaining if not gaining prominence in public discourse.
In the 1990s and early 2000s, US foreign policy, economic power, capacity for world leadership, and American popular culture tended to dominate public discourse and foreign public opinion surveys about the United States. Consequently, it has become more difficult to evaluate opinions on the specific subject of the US political model or American democracy. Surveys do reflect overall evaluations of or "sentiments" towards the United States, and provide a starting point, as long as one bears in mind that such general perceptions are influenced by many competing aspects, and certainly simplify or ignore contradictions and nuances. They are, however, useful as indications of general comparative positions in world contexts.
This said, throughout the 1990s, Spaniards consistently held the United States as a country in moderately high esteem, with only small variations from year to year, in a position that was significantly lower than top-rated Germany but far above the worst rated countries such as Iraq. 61 One 1996 survey of Spanish public opinion revealed that a modestly healthy 35.1 percent had favorable or very favorable "sentiments" towards the United States, whereas only 18.8 percent were critical or very critical, while the majority hung in the middle saying that they had neither favorable nor unfavorable sentiments. 62 A similar survey taken the following year revealed that over 50 percent of participants held favorable or very favorable views of the United States in general, as a country, and, again, only 18 percent were critical. In the same 1997 survey, when asked to choose between pairs of opposite adjectives, 54 percent described the United States as democratic as opposed to 30 percent describing the country as authoritarian, although at the same time this general impression coexisted with a majority opinion (over 58 percent) that associated Americans with conservative political ideology. 63 Spain's moderately favorable general perception of the United States reached 50 percent in 1999-2000 according to the US Department of State. 64 These favorable but unremarkable opinions may indicate that Spain, having become a democracy itself, no longer sees the American political model as being so very different or worthy of special note. Spaniards today are fairly satisfied that their own brand of democracy is at least as good as the American model, and possibly better. 65 Certainly, many Spaniards seem to feel that the US model is too individualistic and, as such, is not actually as successful as Spain in protecting collective well-being and that of the less able.
After the 11-S attacks, Spaniards joined in the general outpouring of sympathetic solidarity towards the USA, but soon attitudes were changing somewhat for the worse. Spaniards' esteem for the United States in general as a country suddenly fell in one survey from the 1990s average of 5.5 (on a scale of 0 to 10) to a score of 4.7 in 2002 and 4.4 in 2006. 66 This sudden shift in popular opinion most certainly reflected public condemnation of the Bush administration's unilateralism and the imminent war in Iraq, and this not only overshadowed more positive evaluations of the American political system, but revealed a deep rift between the people and Spanish political leaders, who gave the United States a high score of 6.81 points, in contrast with their normal tendency to coincide with the general public when expressing the levels of esteem in which they held different countries. 67 69 These same two surveys of 2003 included a question on perceptions of American democracy, with the result that only 31-33 percent of those surveyed specifically approved of American democracy, while 50-61 percent did not approve or had a negative opinion. This dramatic drop in Spanish esteem of the US political model was the lowest overall positive evaluation of any of the regions in the world which were surveyed at that time, and much lower than the average approval rate of the European Union (around 44 percent), and even more so than the Eastern European average (around 50 percent). 70 This trend was confirmed in 2004 by an opinion poll of the United States and European Countries, carried out by the German Marshall Fund. On average, Europeans gave the USA a reading of 55 on a scale of 1 to 100 when asked to rate their favorable sentiments, but Spain expressed "lukewarm feelings" with a rating of only 42, an evaluation that was repeated in the 2005 poll. Chislett interprets that these comparative figures reflect the fact that Spain is the most left-leaning country in Europe and also the most pacifist. 71 Inocencio Arias, who has had a long and distinguished career as a diplomat and has occupied high government posts during both conservative and socialist administrations, has recently declared that a majority of Spaniards currently distrust the US political system and its institutions. 72 In this period, too, the inversion of ideological positions that had been developing slowly since the mid-1950s was almost complete. The old right-wing anti-American bias has been much diluted, as modern Spanish conservatives have gradually become less hostile, sometimes even expressing moderately favorable views of the United States. Anti-Americanism has not disappeared on the right, but it has softened, especially among younger conservatives. 73 Self-identified right-wing participants in a 2002 Spanish survey put their level of esteem of the United States at a solid 5.7 on a scale of 1 to 10. 74 One analysis of the Spanish press through the 1980s and early 1990s shows that the American political model as reflected in its electoral system continued to inspire a mostly positive discourse in two major conservative newspapers. Author Coral Morera concludes that the Catalonian newspaper La Vanguardia consistently argued: "the Soviet system has failed and the United States has triumphed as a political model. We are in the presence of a great country where liberty and progress are a way of life, despite internal and external crises of leadership." The traditionally monarchical ABC offered more pondered and nuanced judgments, but on the whole maintained the idea that the USA is "a great nation, the leading Western power, thanks to a constitutional strength that has made it into a privileged place." 75 These Spanish conservatives, then, not only identify the American political system as a successful democracy but now celebrate that success. By contrast, socialists, communists and other left-leaning groups have generally maintained strong negative attitudes, although there has been some strategic shifting for domestic political reasons and in reaction to the fall of the Soviet Union. Self-declared left-leaning participants in the 2002 Spanish opinion poll put their level of esteem of the United States at 4.3, on a scale of 1 to 10, which was considerably lower than the opinion expressed by Spanish conservatives. 76 The major socialist newspaper El País has consistently published criticisms of the USAmerican political model, although for a few years under the government of Felipe González in the 1980s and early 1990s, official policy did encourage some restraint. 77 On the whole, according to analyst William Chislett, in addition to foreign policy, the chief factor that influences Spanish views of the United States, perhaps more than those of other countries, is "the gap between the democratic values preached at home and what is practiced abroad." 78 He does not venture an explanation of why this is so, but if his observation is correct, one wonders if Spaniards possibly put a particularly high value on democracy because they waited so long and struggled so hard to achieve a democratic regime in their own country. The accusation of hypocrisy that foreign critics so often level at the United States, because of perceived contradictions between what that nation represents itself to be and what its governments do, would certainly resonate with many Spaniards who feel that American policies repeatedly hurt Spanish national interests in the past, and by supporting the Franco regime contributed to the long delay in establishing democracy in their country.
Conclusion
The "self-evident" truths laid down in 1776 were the cornerstone of American national identity; who Americans claimed to be was a function of the ideas they defended. Foreign onlookers might have simply dismissed the American claim to embody democracy, if it had not been for American success in first consolidating and then expanding their political system, while simultaneously deepening the national commitment to the democratic ideals which would form the so-called American creed, the essence of American national identity. 79 This essay has presented an overview of Spanish perceptions of the connection between American national identity and success at three equidistant historical moments over a long period of time. It is a study in bilateral cultural relations, but keeping an eye on the possibilities for comparative studies within the larger framework of historiographical debates about foreign "othering" of the United States. Of course, perceptions of foreign nations are in large part reflections of self-images and comparison with oneself. If, in addition, one believes with Katzenstein and Keohane that anti-American views in foreign countries are so polyvalent that they have little or no effect on those countries' diplomatic relations with the United States, it might seem that the study of foreign perceptions of 77 the United States holds only marginal interest for a superpower in an apparently unipolar world. However, following the lead of Joseph Nye's influential book on "soft power", other authors have argued that "public opinion about U.S. foreign policy in foreign countries does affect their policies towards the U.S." 80 In any case, while neither the American people nor American governments can control the domestic circumstances that color each country's perceptions of the United States, it hardly seems appropriate for a world superpower to ignore foreign opinions, or to eschew opportunities to positively influence them, or at least to avoid aggravating anti-Americanism. 81 In Spain, throughout the long nineteenth century, conservatives would have been happy to see the American experiment fail, and they maintained a doubly negative attitude in the face of American success: first, because the success of American democracy posed an ideological and political threat to the established socio-political order; and second, because that successful democracy created the conditions which led to the spectacular growth of American human and economic resources, which in turn translated into US power, which was a constant threat to Spanish colonial interests in America until Spain's final defeat in 1898. In sum, conservative hostility was a reaction both against who Americans were and what Americans did or might do. By contrast, some enlightened and progressive liberals and most republicans in Spain maintained a strong positive attitude towards the United States, precisely because American success in establishing and developing a democracy served as a source of inspiration and provided them with a model for political, social and cultural reform in Spain. They admired American democracy and the values it represented, ignoring any actions or policies, whether in the United States itself or abroad, that compromised or contradicted that ideal vision. Indeed, they virtually created an American democratic identity based entirely on success, leaving no room at all for suggestions of failure or mention of the contradictions and deficiencies that were so often criticized by their political opponents.
The United States clearly had little hope of improving the dominant negative perceptions of Spanish conservatives, because their scorn, suspicion, fear, hate and hostile envy arose from their own strong attachment to cultural and socio-political conditions in Spain. Similarly, there is no reason to suppose that the United States could have done much to increase the pro-American fervor of the favorable republican views or to increase the number of admirers, because they, too, reflected mainly that minority's radical rejection of the cultural and socio-political conditions in Spain. In the twentieth century, however, both the negative and favorable attitudes were weakened by two main developments. First Spain became a democracy itself. Consequently, Spaniards now generally approve of American democratic values, but no longer find them exceptional, much less modelic. Indeed, from the vantage point of European and Spanish versions of democratic regimes, they find considerable fault with the actual American political system. Second, the United States, by actions that have negatively affected Spanish and world interests, has repeatedly and seriously compromised the values with which the United States professes to identify. Consequently, Spaniards on both sides of the ideological spectrum have become more attentive to and critical of what the United States does, especially when American foreign policy actions and economic interests seem to contradict declared American values.
Many studies indicate the importance of discerning between different types of attitudes towards the United States based on their different motivations. Perceptions that address issues of identity necessarily involve ideological, emotional or cultural bias and are therefore more difficult to influence, whereas opinions expressed in response to policy decisions and actions might be influenced by modifying those policies. 82 There seems little point in American attempts to convince foreigners of the continuing commitment of the United States to its democratic identity, because foreign perceptions clearly depend as much (if not more) on the ideological inclinations and cultural identity of the observers as on the self-image projected by US propaganda and 'soft' power, or even by the democratic reality of the American political system. US governments might change their policies to better reflect American democratic values, but the fact is that they may not be willing or able to substantially change their policies. The only viable solution, then, may well be for US governments to seek ways of explaining their foreign policies without using justifications connected with the defense or promotion of democracy in the world (except of course when this motivation is indisputable and supported by the means of action). This tendency serves only to weaken American identity and the international image of the United States as a democratic nation. Instead, US policies could be publicly based on more rational explanations of national interests and objectives that not only allow for dialogue and negotiation, but also accomodate criticism that does not have to call into question the democratic identity of the United States. Such an effort would certainly not stop foreign or even home-grown anti-Americanist sentiments and discourse, because hostile criticism is a function of asymmetrical power relations in a world in which the United States is the current superpower; but it might help to moderate its excesses.
Sukces jako amerykańska tożsamość w oczach obcokrajowców:
hiszpańskie postrzeganie i struktury historyczne
Wartości demokratyczne są nierozerwalnie związane z amerykańską toż-samością. Stanowią sedno amerykańskiej autoprezentacji zarówno w kraju, jak i za granicą. Jednak obcokrajowcy mogliby odrzucić amerykańskie roszczenia do utożsamiania się z demokracją, gdyby nie polityczny, ekonomiczny, a nawet kulturowy sukces Stanów Zjednoczonych. Ten sukces i jego oczywiste powiązania z demokratycznymi ideami i instytucjami niewątpliwie zostały dostrzeżone. Niniejszy artykuł bada hiszpański punkt widzenia na powiązania pomiędzy amerykańską tożsamością a sukcesem w okresie obejmującym trzy kolejne przełomy wieków. Wraz z historyczną ewolucją obu państw, zmieniało się postrzeganie Stanów Zjednoczonych przez Hiszpanów, choć było ono niezmiennie naznaczone rywalizującymi hiszpańskimi ideologiami politycznymi. Na przykład, przez cały dziewiętnasty wiek hiszpańscy republikanie i niektórzy progresywni liberałowie tak bardzo podziwiali Stany Zjednoczone,że w ich dyskursie fakt zlania się amerykańskiej demokracji i sukcesu nie pozostawiał miejsca na jakiekolwiek sugestie niepowodzenia czy też wzmianki dotyczące przeciwstawieństw lub niedociągnięć, tak często krytykowane przez ich politycznych oponentów. Niniejsza analiza przykładu hiszpańskiego wskazuje,że Amerykanie mają niewielki wpływ na to, w jaki sposób Stany Zjednoczone są postrzegane w poszczególnych krajach. W formułowaniu założeń polityki zagranicznej Stany Zjednoczone powinny kierować się swoimi własnymi interesami, dostrzegając jednak silne antyamerykańskie sentymenty zagranicą, ponieważ opinia publiczna może w niekorzystny sposób wpłynąć na wybór opcji preferowanych przez rządy potencjalnych sojuszników.
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